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Vice President JD Vance is scheduled to lead a team of United States negotiators in Islamabad on Tuesday for talks with Iran aimed at ending their war, even though Tehran is yet to confirm its participation in this latest round of negotiations.

Meanwhile, a fragile two-week ceasefire is poised to expire on Wednesday with no clarity on whether it will be extended amid a spike in tensions over the past two days.

The first round of US-Iran talks in Islamabad on April 11 ended without a breakthrough. Since then, the US has imposed a naval blockade on all Iran-linked ships trying to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has fired at ships trying to transit through the vital shipping route. And early on Monday, the US shot at and then seized an Iranian vessel trying to pass through the narrow waterway.

Tehran called the ship’s seizure “piracy” and has threatened retribution. It has refused to join talks under the shadow of threats. Trump has revived his warning that he would order the US military to blow up all bridges and power plants in Iran if it does not accept a deal on US terms.

Amid this uncertainty over the future of the talks and the truce, we break down the latest from both sides and four potential scenarios that could play out in the next few days:

What’s the latest from both sides?

Both the US and Iran have been exchanging threats as the ceasefire is due to expire in the coming hours.

The two-week ceasefire, announced by US President Donald Trump on April 7, should expire at 8pm Washington, DC, time on Tuesday (midnight GMT, 3:30am in Tehran and 5am in Islamabad on Wednesday). However, Trump has in recent comments indicated that he has already moved the deadline back by a day.

While Islamabad continues with its preparations to host multiday talks, there has been no confirmation yet from Iranian officials about whether they will attend.

The US president said he feels confident Iran will negotiate or it will “see problems like they’ve never seen before”.

Trump confirmed in a Truth Social post that the US delegation is planning to visit Islamabad on Tuesday. While accusing Iran of violating the ceasefire by firing at vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, Trump added: “We’re offering a very fair and reasonable DEAL, and I hope they take it because, if they don’t, the United States is going to knock out every single Power Plant, and every single Bridge, in Iran. NO MORE MR. NICE GUY!”

Meanwhile, Iran maintained there will be no negotiations under the shadow of threats.

Mohammad Reza Mohseni Sani, who sits on the Iranian parliament’s National Security Commission, cast further doubt on the prospects of talks with the US.

He said in comments carried by Iran’s Mehr news agency that “negotiations are not acceptable” in “the current situation” accusing the US of being “overly demanding” and pursuing ulterior objectives for domestic benefit.

“Given the current conditions, recent aggressions and the history we have with the United States in previous negotiations, the next round of talks is, God willing, off the table,” he said.

Ali Vaez, the Iran project director for the International Crisis Group think tank, told Al Jazeera that the key hurdle before any second round of talks was “whether the US is willing to ease pressure enough to make diplomacy credible and whether Iran is willing to curb its leverage enough to keep talks alive”.

Scenario 1: Talks happen and achieve a temporary deal

Pakistan has been aiming to get the US and Iran to agree to multiple days of negotiations, sources close to the mediation efforts told Al Jazeera.

For the US, Vance is expected to be joined by Trump’s envoy and fellow real estate developer Steve Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, the same team that participated in the first round of talks. If the Iranians come, the parliament’s speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, is again expected to lead their delegation, which will also include Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

Mediators in Islamabad are aiming to reach a “memorandum of understanding” between the US and Iran to buy time to achieve a final deal and extend the ceasefire.

“Success would not be a final deal. It would be an interim understanding that extends talks, stabilises the ceasefire and creates a framework for trading nuclear steps for sanctions relief,” Vaez said.

However, glaring differences exist in the demands and expectations from both sides, including over Tehran’s nuclear programme, control of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions on Iran and its frozen assets.

“If the two sides do not change their stances, there cannot be a deal in Islamabad,” said Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, an associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the Chatham House think tank.

Scenario 2: Talks end without a breakthrough but with a ceasefire extension

For there to be any meaningful progress in the talks, “there needs to be compromises on both sides because at the moment there is too much of a gap to reach an agreement,” Tabrizi told Al Jazeera.

“Unless that changes, it’s unlikely that we will see a deal,” she said.

Trump has doubled down in recent days on his insistence that Iran stop all uranium enrichment and hand over its current stockpile of enriched uranium. Iran has rejected those demands.

“The US is not learning its lessons from experience,” Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Monday. “And this will never lead to good results.”

Still, Tabrizi said, even in the absence of a breakthrough in a second round of talks, the two sides may agree to “some sort of temporary extension of the ceasefire”, which would give diplomacy another chance.

Scenario 3: No talks but the ceasefire is extended

Trump told Bloomberg News on Monday that he considers the ceasefire over “Wednesday evening Washington time” and said it was “highly unlikely” that he would extend it if no deal is reached.

Still, a last-minute post on his Truth Social platform extending the ceasefire would not necessarily be surprising, analysts said – even if Iran refuses to show up to the talks in Islamabad.

“It [would be] a fragile pause, not a durable ceasefire,” Vaez said. “As long as maritime pressure and mutual accusations continue, the risk of miscalculation remains very high.”

“Without a diplomatic framework, it would be buying time, not building stability,” he added.

Tabrizi agreed. Already, though, the war has fundamentally changed the US-Iran equation, she said.

“President Trump is arguing that regime change has happened because the figures that they are dealing with are different,” Tabrizi said. “Iran probably doesn’t seem to see the US as an existential threat like before the fighting started.”

Scenario 4: Talks fail, and the ceasefire expires

Trump’s repeated threats to restart the bombing of Iran in the absence of a deal also open up a fourth scenario: If Iranian negotiators do not travel to Islamabad for the talks, that threat will be tested.

“Then lots of bombs start going off,” Trump said to PBS News on Monday when asked about what follows if the ceasefire expires. Trump added that Iran was “supposed to be there” for the negotiations. “We’ll see whether or not it’s there. If they’re not there, that’s fine too,” he said.

Ghalibaf said on Tuesday that Trump “seeks to turn this negotiating table, in his own imagination, into a table of surrender or to justify renewed warmongering”.

“We have prepared to reveal new cards on the battlefield,” he added, suggesting that Tehran was prepared militarily for a resumption of the fighting.

But if the ceasefire collapses, “the next round is likely to get very ugly very quickly,” Vaez warned. “The US will likely target critical infrastructure in Iran, which in turn will torch the rest of the region.”

United States President Donald Trump has said a nuclear agreement currently being negotiated with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which he withdrew from in 2018 during his first term in office.

The original 2015 accord took roughly two years of negotiations to reach and involved hundreds of specialists across technical and legal fields, including multiple US experts. Under it, Iran agreed to restrict the enrichment of uranium and to subject itself to inspections in exchange for the relaxation of sanctions.

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But Trump took the US out of that pact, calling it the “worst deal ever”. Before the initial US-Israeli strikes on Iran at the end of February, the US had made new demands – including additional restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear programme, the restriction of its ballistic missiles programme and an end to its support for regional armed groups, primarily in Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq.

Trump’s latest remarks come amid growing uncertainty about whether a second round of talks will proceed in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, as a two-week ceasefire between the US-Israel and Iran approaches the end in just a day.

So, what was the JCPOA, and how did it compare to Trump’s new demands?

What was the JCPOA?

On July 14, 2015, Iran reached an agreement with the European Union and six major powers – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the US, and Germany – under which these states would roll back international economic sanctions and allow Iran greater participation in the global economy.

In return, Tehran committed to limiting activities that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon.

These included reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium by about 98 percent, to less than 300kg (660lb), and capping uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent – far below weapons-grade of 90 percent, but high enough for civilian purposes such as power generation.

Before the JCPOA, Iran operated roughly 20,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges. Under the deal, that number was cut to a maximum of 6,104, and only older-generation machines confined to two facilities, which were subject to international monitoring.

Centrifuges are machines which spin to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope – enrichment – in uranium, a key step towards potential bomb-making.

The deal also redesigned Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor to prevent plutonium production and introduced one of the most intrusive inspection regimes ever implemented by the global nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In exchange, Iran received relief from international sanctions which had severely damaged its economy. Billions of dollars in frozen assets were released, and restrictions on oil exports and banking were eased.

The deal came to halt when Trump formally withdrew Washington from the nuclear deal in 2018, a move widely criticised domestically and by foreign allies, and despite the IAEA saying Iran had complied with the agreement up to that point.

“The Iranian regime supports terrorism and exports violence, bloodshed and chaos across the Middle East. That is why we must put an end to Iran’s continued aggression and nuclear ambitions. They have not lived up to the spirit of their agreement,” he said in October 2017.

He reimposed crippling economic sanctions on Tehran as part of his “maximum pressure” tactic. These targeted Iran’s oil exports, as well as its shipping sector, banking system and other key industries.

The goal was to force Iran back to the negotiating table to agree to a new deal, which also included a discussion about Tehran’s missile capabilities, further curbs on enrichment and more scrutiny of its nuclear programme.

What has happened to Iran’s nuclear programme since the JCPOA?

During the JCPOA period, Iran’s nuclear programme was tightly constrained and heavily monitored. The IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran was complying with the deal’s terms, including one year after Trump announced the US’s withdrawal from the agreement.

Starting in mid-2019, however, Iran began incrementally breaching the deal’s limits, exceeding caps on uranium stockpiles and enrichment levels.

In November 2024, Iran said it would activate “new and advanced” centrifuges. The IAEA confirmed that Tehran had informed the nuclear watchdog that it planned to install more than 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium.

In December 2024, the IAEA said Iran was rapidly enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, moving closer to the 90 percent threshold needed for weapons-grade material. Most recently, in 2025, the IAEA estimated that Iran had 440kg (970lb) of 60-percent enriched uranium.

What are Trump’s latest demands for Iran’s nuclear programme?

The US and its ally, Israel, are pushing Iran to agree to zero uranium enrichment and have accused Iran of working towards building a nuclear weapon, while providing no evidence for their claims.

They also want Iran’s estimated 440kg stock of 60pc enriched uranium to be removed from Iran. While that is below weapons-grade, it is the point at which it becomes much faster to achieve the 90 percent enrichment needed for atomic weapons production.

Iran has insisted its enrichment effort is for civilian purposes only. It is a signatory to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

In March 2025, Tulsi Gabbard, the US director of national intelligence, testified to Congress that the US “continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon”.

On Sunday, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, in a strongly worded statement, said Trump had no right to ⁠⁠”deprive” Iran of its nuclear ⁠⁠rights.

What else is Trump asking for?

Restrictions on ballistic missiles

Before the US-Israel war on Iran began, Tehran had always insisted negotiations should be exclusively focused on Iran’s nuclear programme.

US and Israeli demands, however, extended beyond that. Just before the war began, Washington and Israel demanded severe restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme.

Analysts say this demand was at least partly triggered by the fact that several Iranian missiles had breached Israel’s much-vaunted “Iron Dome” defence system during the 12-day war between the two countries in June last year. While Israel suffered only a handful of casualties, it is understood to have been alarmed.

For his part, Trump has repeatedly warned, without evidence, about the dangers of Iran’s long-range missiles, claiming Iran is producing them “in very high numbers” and they could “overwhelm the Iron Dome”.

Iran has said its right to maintain missile capabilities is non-negotiable. The JCPOA did not put any limits on the development of ballistic missiles.

However, a United Nations resolution made when adopting the nuclear agreement in July 2015 did stipulate that Iran could not “undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons”.

Ending support for proxy groups

The US and Israel have also demanded that Iran stop supporting its non-state allies across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and a number of groups in Iraq. Together, these groups are referred to as Iran’s “axis of resistance”.

In May last year, Trump said Tehran “must stop sponsoring terror, halt its bloody proxy wars, and permanently and verifiably cease pursuit of nuclear weapons”, during a GCC meeting in Riyadh.

Three days before the war on Iran began in February, during his State of the Union address to Congress, Trump accused Iran and “its murderous proxies” of spreading “nothing but terrorism and death and hate”.

Iran has refused to enter a dialogue about limiting its support for these armed groups.

Can Trump really get a new deal that is ‘much better’ than the JCPOA?

According to Andreas Kreig, associate professor of Security Studies at King’s College, London, Trump is more likely to secure a new deal that closely resembles the JCPOA, with “some form of restrictions on enrichment, possibly with a sunset clause, and international supervision”.

“Iran might get access to frozen assets and lifted sanctions much quicker than under the JCPOA, as it will not agree to a long drawn-out, gradual lifting of sanctions,” Krieg pointed out.

However, he warned that the political landscape in Tehran has hardened. “Iran now is a far more hardline and less pragmatic player that will play hardball at every junction. Trump cannot count on any goodwill in Tehran,” he said.

“The IRGC is now firmly in charge… with likely new powerful and tested levers such as the Strait of Hormuz,” he said, referring to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which operates as a parallel elite military force to the army and has a great deal of political and economic power in Iran. It is a constitutionally recognised part of the Iranian military and answers directly to the supreme leader.

Overall, Krieg stressed, the US-Israel war on Iran “leaves the world worse off than had Trump stuck to the JCPOA”, even if a new compromise is eventually reached.

Moreover, since the revocation of the JCPOA, the US and Israel have waged two wars on Iran, including the current one. The 12-day war in June last year included attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites and killed more than 1,000 people.

Attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure have continued since the latest war began on February 28, including on the Natanz enrichment facility, Isfahan nuclear complex, Arak heavy water reactor, and the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Nevertheless, King’s College’s Krieg said there is still room for a negotiated outcome if Tehran and Washington scale back their demands.

“Both sides can compromise on enrichment thresholds, and on temporary moratoriums on enrichments. But Iran will not surrender its sovereignty to enrich altogether, and the Trump administration will have to meet them halfway,” he said.

“While the Iranians will commit on paper not to develop a nuclear weapon, they will want to keep R&D [research and development] in this space alive.”

Economic incentives will be central, he added. “Equally, Iran would want to get immediate access to capital and liquidity. Here, the Trump administration is already willing to compromise.”