Author: rb809rb

The trader who legally withdrew 4.426 trillion $BONK tokens from the $BONK treasury through the governance process is reportedly continuing to sell.

According to on-chain data shared via X, the trader in question sold another 800 billion $BONK tokens today. The sale is said to be worth approximately $2.48 million.

In the incident on July 6th, the trader gained control of a total of 4.426 trillion $BONK tokens from the $BONK treasury, worth approximately $21.2 million. Since then, the price of $BONK has fallen by about 40%.

According to the shared data, the trader still holds 2.4 trillion $BONK tokens in their wallet. This amount is said to be worth approximately $6.94 million at current prices.

$BONK, once one of the largest memecoins in the Solana ecosystem, is experiencing difficult times due to the decline in the memecoin movement and the recent cyberattack. The token continued its losses today, experiencing a 14% drop. Having reached a peak market capitalization exceeding $4 billion, the token currently holds a market capitalization of $243 million at the time of writing.

*This is not investment advice.

Strategy founder Michael Saylor has published a comprehensive assessment of the BIP 110 proposal, which aims to limit data usage on the Bitcoin network. Saylor notes that while supporters of the proposal share the goals of reducing node running costs, keeping payments accessible, and preserving Bitcoin’s sound money focus, he opposes changing consensus rules as a solution.

Saylor added that those supporting BIP 110 were acting in good faith, stating that the debate stemmed not from individuals but from the technical and governance risks posed by the proposal. While not defending every inscription, token, file, or application, Saylor said the fundamental question was whether transactions that are valid and payable under existing rules should be blocked at the consensus level on the grounds of controversial use.

BIP 110 is projected to introduce seven new restrictions to Bitcoin’s consensus rules during its approximately one-year active period. The proposal aims to limit new scriptPubKey sizes, certain payloads, Taproot control blocks, and some Tapscript functionality, while also temporarily disabling the use of the Taproot annex, OP_SUCCESSx, and future witness and Tapleaf versions.

The proposal also includes an activation model that differs from the standard BIP 9 mechanism. It plans to lower the miner signal threshold from the usual 95% to 55%, implement a mandatory signal period, and eliminate the classic timeout mechanism. According to Saylor, opting for a lower activation threshold in a controversial consensus change increases the risk of chain breakage and economic uncertainty.

At the heart of Saylor’s objections was Bitcoin’s neutrality. He argued that the BTC network cannot discern whether the data in a transaction is visual, a contract, an authentication record, proof of reserve, or another application to be developed in the future, and therefore, restrictions based on technical forms could also affect legitimate use cases.

Saylor argued that the concept of “spam” cannot be objectively defined by consensus rules, and that a transaction being deemed meaningless, speculative, or controversial does not invalidate it. According to Saylor, if a transaction complies with existing rules and pays the required fee, societal dissatisfaction with its intended use does not constitute sufficient justification for a change in consensus.

Saylor noted that BIP 110 does not offer measurable targets regarding node costs, decentralization, transaction fees, and benefits for payment users, adding that bandwidth, storage, UTXO growth, validation overhead, and fee impacts need to be analyzed separately.

Saylor pointed out that the proposal would close areas reserved for future Bitcoin software updates, such as the Taproot annex, future witness releases, Tapleaf releases, and OP_SUCCESSx. He stated that the fact that these features aren’t actively used today doesn’t mean they’re redundant, adding that these areas were deliberately reserved for future needs.

Saylor noted that the proposal could affect advanced off-chain contracts similar to BitVM, some builds generated by Miniscript, and custom Taproot scenarios, adding that even a temporary restriction could significantly alter developers’ plans, wallet software, and institutional risk policies for a long time.

According to Saylor, the temporary nature of BIP 110 does not eliminate the risk. He argues that the activation and expiration dates will create two separate critical consensus thresholds, and that the exemptions granted to historical UTXOs will make the validation rules more complex.

Saylor stated that although BIP 110 aims to reduce payment fees by limiting data processing, the economic consequences are uncertain, noting that demand could shift to more complex methods or that total transaction fee revenue could decrease.

Saylor, noting that transaction fees are becoming increasingly important for miner revenue due to the decrease in the Bitcoin block reward with each halving, argued that a decrease in total fee demand could weaken investments in hash power, all other things being equal.

Saylor also noted that Bitcoin already distributes scarce block space neutrally through its block weight cap and fee market. He said users aren’t required to disclose the purpose of their transactions, and miners can decide which transactions to add to their blocks according to their own policies.

Saylor proposed using node, relay, and mining policies instead of consensus changes to address controversial data transactions. He noted that data transport policies in Bitcoin Core are configurable, arguing that miners have the freedom to exclude certain transaction types from their blocks, but that this differs from the entire network invalidating the same transactions.

He said that if resource usage is proven to be truly disproportionate, narrower regulations based on measurable technical costs rather than transaction intent could be considered. He also suggested working on pruning, on-demand data storage, Layer 2 solutions, and more advanced fee market tools.

According to Saylor, the most dangerous consequence of BIP 110 will not be the temporary rules, but the permanent precedent it will create. He argued that changing the consensus today to block certain data uses could pave the way for similar demands in the future for privacy tools, new storage methods, stablecoin consensus, token systems, or enterprise applications.

Saylor stated that no single group in Bitcoin has exclusive authority over consensus, emphasizing the need for broad collaboration among developers, node operators, miners, investors, exchanges, wallet providers, custodians, and institutions.

Saylor, who also argued that institutional participation is legitimate for Bitcoin, said that companies provide capital, scale, accountability, and continuity, but this does not give institutions special authority to reach a consensus.

Saylor concluded his 110-point assessment with the view that the solution proposed by BIP 110 is more dangerous than the problem it addresses. He characterized the proposal as the “Bitcoin Iatrogenic Proposal,” meaning that the treatment applied to Bitcoin causes greater harm.

*This is not investment advice.

Bitcoin signatures rely on elliptic curve cryptography, a system in which a private key generates a public key through math that runs only one way. Anyone can check the public key, but nobody can work backward to the private one. However, Shor’s algorithm, a quantum method published in 1994 for problems that ordinary computers cannot crack, can be fed a public key and return the private key that generated it.

Hashing is a different kind of problem. A hash scrambles an input into a fixed-length fingerprint and cannot be run backward, and the best quantum attack on it, called Grover’s algorithm, only halves the exponent rather than collapsing it, taking a 256-bit hash from 2^256 guesses down to 2^128.

That is still more guesses than a machine making a billion a second could get through in the lifetime of the universe.

Modern wallets are built on hashing. A wallet generates addresses in a tree, deriving each key from its parent, and a “hardened” derivation step feeds the parent’s private key through HMAC-SHA512 to produce the child key.

That is a one-way function. An attacker who breaks an address after Q-Day ends up holding exactly the key held, and cannot climb the tree to the key it came from.